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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v.
USERY: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EQUAL PAY ACT
AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
In 1974 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) 1 to extend coverage to most nonsupervisory federal, state,
and local government employees. Governmental employers became subject to 'the FLSA minimum wage and maximum hours
provisions and to the Equal Pay Act (EPA) 2 which was enacted
separately in 1963 but was incorporated into the F:LSA. The 1974
Amendments also extended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 3 to cover governmental employees.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 4 the Supreme Court
invalidated the application of the FLSA minimum wage and
maximum hours provisions to certain essential state government
activities as an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty.
This article will explore the implications of that decision with
respect to the application of the EPA and the ADEA to state and
local governments.
Pait I contains a brief discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and Amendments. Part II discusses National League with reference to traditional commerce clause interpretation. Part III
analyzes the difficulties of applying the decision, particularly the
problem of defining the essential state functions immunized by the
tenth amendment from federal regulation. It is suggested that National League should be interpreted as requiring a balancing of the
federal interest and the degree of federal intrusion against the state
claim to immunity. While Part IV explains the background of the
EPA and the ADEA, Part V discusses the effect of the National
League decision on the application of the EPA and the ADEA to
the states.

1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Fair Labor St'andards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 [hereinafter cited as 1974
Amendments].
2
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I) (1970).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55. The ADEA incorporates the
enforcement provisions of§ 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 626 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
See note 9 infra.
4
426 u .s. 833 (I 976).
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I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: BACKGROUND

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 5 enacted pursuant to the
commerce clause, was based, in part, on a congressional determination that "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers" burden interstate commerce, provoke labor disputes, and constitute an unfair method of competition.6 The Act was intended to eliminate substandard labor conditions "as rapidly as practicable ... without substantially curtailing
employment or earning power. " 7 The FLSA prescribed two major
fair labor standards: a minimum wage 8 and an overtime rate for
work in excess of a forty-hour week. 9 In 1963 the Equal Pay Act
added an additional fair labor standard requiring equal pay for
equal work. 10
Although the FLSA originally applied only to workers engaged
in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate
commerce, the coverage of the Act has been expanded by a series
of amendments. The 1961 Amendments significantly broadened the
scope of the FLSA by introducing the "enterprise" concept of
coverage . 11 The purpose of this extension wa~ to reach all
employees of an enterprise which has any employees engaged in

5
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The motive, purpose, and scope of the
original Act were construed, and its constitutionality upheld, in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), and Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942). See also Powell v.
United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317
U.S. 564 (1943); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942).
6 FLSA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970).
7
FLSA § 2(b), 29 U .S.C. § 202(b) (1970).
6
FLSA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This section incorporates the Equal
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
9
FLSA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Section 16(a) of the FLSA, 29 U .S.C. § 216 (1970), provides criminal penalties for willful
violation of the Act. A private cause of action is authorized in § 16(b), 29 U .S.C. § 216(b)
(Supp. V 1975), against any employer (including a public agency) in any federal or state
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees to recover withheld compensation and an additional equal amount in liquidated damages. However, a class action on
behalf of other employees similarly situated requires the written consent of each employee
joined as a party plaintiff. The right to file a private action terminates upon the filing of
proceedings under § 217 by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin any further delay in the
payment of withheld compensation owed to the employee.
Section 16(c), 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. V 1975), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to
supervise settlements and to bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to
recover withheld wages and liquidated damages. The private right of action provided in §
16(b) terminates upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary.
Section 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970), grants jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the Act to the
federal district courts.
10
See part IV. A. infra.
11
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1%1, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (amending
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970)). The enterprise concept increased the number of employees
protected without increasing the number of employers subject to the Act.
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interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.
In 1966 the FLSA was extended to state and local government
workers employed in hospitals and related health care institutions,
special schools and educational institutions, and local transit operations.12 The 1974 Amendments extended coverage to nearly all
federal, state, and local government employees. 13 The original
Act's exemption for executive, administrative, and professional
employees was retained, 14 and additional exemptions were established for elected officials and their immediate staffs. 15 The legislative history of the 1974 Amendments reflected a policy not only of
regulating commerce, but also of assuming an affirmative federal
responsibility to increase the minimum wage of all public sector
employees. 16
The enterprise concept and the limited 1966 extension of coverage to government employees were upheld as constitutional under
the power of the federal commerce clause in Maryland v. Wirtz. 17
Using traditional commerce clause analysis, 18 the Court held that
Congress had a rational basis for the regulation of enterprises
involved in interstate commerce because it could find that substandard wages and hours have a substantial, disruptive effect on
interstate commerce. 19 The Court rejected the challenge that the
12 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (amending
29 U .S.C. § 203(1970)). Section 3(d) was amended to include a .state or political subdivision
within the definition of "employer;" § 3(r) was amended to include these activities within
the definition of "enterprise;" and § 3(s) was amended to make it clear that these state
operations qualify as an "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce."
13
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 5~ (amending
29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)). "Employer" was redefined to include a public agency in§ 3(d); the
definitions of "enterprise" and "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce" in § 3(r) and (s) were amended to include the activities of a public
agency; "public agency" was defined to include the government of a state or any interstate
governmental agency in § 3(x).
14
FLSA § 13(a)(l), 29 U .S.C. § 213(a)(l) (1970).
1
• FLSA § 3(e)(2)(C}, 29 U .S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (Supp,. V 1975).
16
H.R. REP. No. 913. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9. revrinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811, 2817-19. As a means of enforcing the amended Act, Congress specifically
authorized a private cause of action against state and local government employe1•s. 2'J
U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1975). This explicit authorization of a private "16(b)" action
against government employers was the legislative response to the decision in Employees v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), which held that there was no
clear expression of congressional intent in the FLSA to deprive states of their eleventh
amendment immunity to suit. H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41, 45, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2850, 2853. The decision in Employees implied
that a clear expression of congressional intent to override state immunity to suit would
suffice to subject the states to suit under thj! FLSA. 41 I U.S. at 284-85.
17
392 U.S. 183 ( 1968). The Court in National League overruled the Wirtz holding that the
1966 Amendments were constitutional as applied to the states. 426 U.S. at 840, 853-54.
18
See notes 29-39 and accompanying text infra.
19
392 U.S. at 189-92. The substantial effect on interstate commerce rested alternatively
on (I) the congressional finding that substandard wages and excessive hours gives the
employer an unfair competitive advantage, or (2).the congressional finding that substandard
labor conditions lead to labor disputes. which disrupt the free flow of goods. Both findings
were deemed to have a rational basis, thus exhausting the scope of judicial review.
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Amendments impermissibly interfere with state sovereignty. 20 According to the Wirtz Court, the Act requires only that the state
employer be bound by the same restrictions that bind a wide range
of private employers whose activities affect interstate commerce.
As a. valid regulation of interstate commerce, the 1966 Amendments affect state and private employers equally so that the federal
interest cannot be outweighed by a state claim of sovereign immunity.
II. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY

In National League of Cities v. Usery, 21 a five-to-four decision
with Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, 22 the Supreme
Court rejected the "far reaching implications" of Maryland v.
Wirtz. 23 The Court held that insofar as the 1974 FLSA Amendments "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress" under
the commerce clause. 24 In the Court's view, the power to determine the wages and hours of employees performing governmental
functions is an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty. " 25 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the 1974 Amendments operate directly on "the States qua States," displacing state policy choices
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of governmental services, and substantially restructuring "traditional
ways in which the local governments have arranged their affairs. "26 Where the states exercise "functions essential to separate
• 0 Id. at 195-96. According to Wirtz, there is a rational basis for a congressional finding
that these state-operated schools and hospitals are sufficiently related to interstate commerce because either (I) such institlftions are major users of interstate goods, or (2) the labor
disputes in these governmental agencies will disrupt interstate commerce. The state claim of
sovereign immunity was upheld by the National League majority in the context of the 1974
FLSA Amendments. See part II. A. infra.
21 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing
National League of Cities. 11 GA. L. REV. 35 (1976); Percy, National League of Cities v.
Usery: The Tenth Amendment ls Alive and Doing Well, 51 TuL. L. REV. 95 (1976).
22 Justices Burger, Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun joined Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Brennan filed a
dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall, and Justice Stevens filed a
separate dissent.
23 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840, 853-54 (1976).
•• Id. at 852. This summary of the holding by the Court is not wholly consistent with the
majority's analysis of the Amendments as fully within the grant of legislative authority under
the commerce clause, but nevertheless invalid as offending a separate constitutional limitation expressed in the tenth amendment. There is a certain conceptual confusion in the
opinion as a result of the majority's failure to precisely define the reach of the commerce
power and the nature of the limit on commerce clause regulations which directly affect state
and local governments. See part II. A. infra.
25
Id. at 845.
26
ld. at 847-49.

WINTER

1977]

Implications of National League

243

and independent existence, " 27 the tenth amendment was held to
operate as an "express declaration" of a "constitutional barrier" 28
against interference by the federal government.
A. The Tenth Amendment As A Limitation
On the Commerce Power

The reasoning in National League differs significantly from prior
cases interpreting the "plenary" scope of the commerce clause and
the limited nature of judicial review over exercises of this power. 29
According to the traditional interpretation of the commerce clause,
Congress may statutorily declare that certain activities have a
sufficiently substantial effect upon interstate commerce to justify
federal regulation. Judicial review is then limited to three questions: first, whether there is a rational basis for the congressional
finding that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce; second, whether the selected means of regulation are
reasonably related to the legislative objective; and finally, whether

27
Id. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Smith. 221 U.S. 559. 580 (1911). quoting Lane County v.
Oregon. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71. 76 (1869).
28
/d. at 841-42.
29 In United States v. Darby.312 U.S. 100 ( 1941). the Court upheld the original Fair Labor
Standards Act against the challenge that it impermissibly interfered with the authority of the
states. reserved to them by the tenth amendment. to control the conditions of production.
The Court held that Congress could regulate intrastate activities where they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This authority may be implemented by a wide choice of
appropriate means. provided that the object of the regulation is sufficiently related to
interstate commerce. Faced with a congressional determination that a specific subject of
regulation affects commerce. "the only function of courts is to determine whether the
particular activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of the federal powers ... Id. at
120-21.
The Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel. Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). upheld
the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court concluded that
Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected
commerce and that the means chosen to eliminate the obstruction were appropriate and
reasonably adapted to a permitted end. In Katzenbach v. McClung. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). the
Court deferred to a congressional finding that discrimination in restaurants inhibited interstate commerce. Justice Clark articulated the two-part inquiry before the Court:
[T]he mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to
affect commerce does not· preclude further examination by this Court. But where
we find that the legislators. in light of the facts and testimony before them. have a
rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
commerce. our investigation is at an end. The only remaining question ... is
whether the particular restaurant either serves or offers to serve interstate travelers
or serves food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce.
Id. at 303-04.
For other examples of the rational basis analysis of commerce clause regulations. see
Maryland v. Wirtz. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). discussed at notes 17-20 and accompanying text
;mpra; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co .. 317 U.S. 564 (1943); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling
Co. v. Hall. 317 U.S. 88 (1942): Kirshbaum Co. v. Walling. 316 U.S. 517 (1942); Oklahoma
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co .. 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB. 303
U.S. 453 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp .. 301 U.S. I (1937); Gibbons v.
Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824)._See also note 36 infra.
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the affected party or business is properly within the regulated
class. 30
The majority opinion in National League evaded a "rational
basis" analysis of the 1974 FLSA Amendments by interposing the
tenth amendment as an express "affirmative limitation" which
may restrict the exercise of power otherwise expressly delegated to
Congress. 31 This constitutional limitation is triggered, in the
Court's view, when Congress seeks to directly regulate the activities of the states as employers. 32 Accordingly, the 1974 FLSA
Amendments were invalid not because Congress lacked affirmative
authority to reach state employers under the commerce clause, but
30
The third inquiry. which focuses on the application of the statute in the particular case
before the Court, will not lead to invalidation of the regulation where the complainant's
impact on interstate commerce is individually trivial or remote if the class is rationally
defined and the aggregate effect of like persons similarly situated is substantial. Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1968); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 127-28 (1942).
31
426 U.S. at 841. Until the late l930's, the tenth amendment had been interpreted as
reserving to the states the exclusive regulation of certain "local" concerns-i.e., productive
industries (agriculture. mining. and manufacuturing) and employment conditions prior to
any interstate movement. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v.
Butler. 297 U.S. I (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). This use of'the tenth
amendment to support the exclusive right of the states to regulate certain private activity
was rejected as a limitation on the federal commerce power in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 116-17. 123 (1941). The National League Court used the tenth amendment not to
demarcate an area of commerce which the states alone may control. but to limit federal
regulations directly affecting the state itself as an employer. 426 U.S. at 841.
32
The majority opinion does not clearly define the source or scope of the "constitutional
barrier" against this exercise of congressional authority. At one point. however, it referred
to the "established constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity consistently
recognized in a long series of our cases." 426 U.S. at 837. This doctrine is not explicitly
based on the text of the Constitution, but was developed by judicial implication. See notes
60-73 and accompanying text infra. The majority opinion in National League also referred to
"limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty" imposed by "our federal
system of government." Id. at 842. The Court apparently found an affirmative declaration of
this federalism limitation in the tenth amendment, and applied it, in a manner similar to the
limitations of the fifth and sixth amendment, to restrict the exercise. of delegated federal
powers.
In his dissenting opinion, Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), Justice Rehnquist
stated:
·
[A]n individual who attacks an Act of Congress on the ground that it is not within
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause asserts only a claim of lack of
legislative power .... [T]his individual's claim is ordinarily very difficult to sustain. But an individual who attacks an Act of Congress, justified under the Commerce Clause, on the ground that it infringes his rights under, say, the First or Fifth
Amendment, is asserting an affirmative constitutional defense of his own, one
which can limit the exercise of power whicb is otherwise expressly delegated to
Congress. That the latter claim is of greater force, and may succeed when the
former will fail, is well established ....
. . . [In Fry] the State is not simply asserting an absence of congressional
legislative authority, but rather is asserting an affirmative constitutional right,
inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally asserted
authority. Whether such a claim on the part of a State should prevail against
congressional authority is quite a different question, but it is surely no answer to
the claim to say that a "state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been
authorized than can an individual."
Id. at 552-53, quoting in part United States v. California, 297 U.S. I 75, 185 (1936) (emphasis
added).
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because the effect of the regulatio.ns impaired the states' "ability to
function effectively within a federal system. " 33 According to the
National League Court, the state employer, as a "coordinate element" in the federal system, may not be regulated in the same
manner as a private employer. 34
The National League interpretation of the tenth amendment as a
functional limitation on the exercise of the commerce power is a
departure from the traditional understanding of this amendment
literally applicable only to powers not delegated to the federal
govemment. 35 The Court has frequently refused to construe it as a
limitation upon the exercise of a specifically granted power, even
when states have been directly affected by a federal regulation. 36
In responding to a challenge to the original Fair Labor Standards
Act, Justice Stone declared that the tenth amendment "states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. " 37 This
now-familiar pronouncement was qualified in the majority opinion
in Fry v. United States, 38 upholding the application of federal wage
controls to the states:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not
been surrendered," ... it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
33

426 U.S. at 852, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7.
426 U.S. at 849.
35
U.S. CoNST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Consitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."
36
See, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958) (California statute
requiring approval by PUC of carrier rates for public property held unconstitutional in view
of comprehensive federal government procurement policy); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553 (1957) (national policy of collective bargaining incorporated in the Railway Labor Act
supersedes a state's right to control employment relations of a state-owned railroad); United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). See notes 68-70 and accompanying text infra;
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (state tax
immunity narrowly read as inapplicable to federal right to levy customs duties on state
imports pursuant to the commerce power); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266
U.S. 405 (1925) (authority of the United States to remove obstructions to interstate commerce by enjoining withdrawal of water from Lake Michigan held superior to the city's need
to provide sewage disposal for its inhabitants); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352
(1913). Accord, Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F.2d 671 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1973) (freeze order
issued under economic stabilization order did not unconstitutionally infringe a state's right to
raise revenue for legitimate state ends); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970) (upheld 1966 FLSA Amendments against a challenge based on
the eleventh amendment immunity of a state to suit in federal courts). See also Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), and United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1%1) (federal
exercise of war power overrides state claim of tenth amendment immunity); Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (by operating a railroad in interstate commerce, a state
waives its eleventh amendment immunity to suit under federal commerce clause regulations); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S 379 (1%3) (power to establish inferior
courts and the power to grant patents upheld against a tenth amendment claim); Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (federal spending power construed
to outweigh sovereign state interest).
37
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
38
421 U.S. 542 (1975).
34
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Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system. 39

The National League majority relied upon this language in support
of the view that federal intrusion into areas of state sovereignty
affronts a specific constitutional prohibition. 40
Justice Brennan, who was joined in his dissent by Justices White
and Marshall, criticized the interposition of the tenth amendment
as an affirmative restriction on the exercise of the commerce
power. 41 In the dissenters' view, the tenth amendment offers no
justification for treating states and private parties differently where
federal commerce regulations are involved; if a regulation is constitutional, then it extends equally to both. 42 Justice Brennan contended that the majority opinion departed from precedent by inventing an express state sovereignty limitation on the commerce
power and by extending the scope of judicial review of commerce
clause regulation. 43 Instead of applying the rational basis test to
federal commerce clause legislation, the National League Court
chose to invoke the tenth amendment to correct what it regarded as
an imbalance in the federal system. Implicit in the decision is a
more active role for the federal judiciary as arbiter of the appropriate line between federal regulation and state governmental immunity. 44
39
Id. at 547 n.7. Whatever significance the tenth amendment has under this view. it was
not sufficient to invalidate the regulations at issue in Fry. See notes 86-91 and accompanying
text infra.
40
426 U.S. at 842-43.
41
Justice Brennan stated. "[T]here is no restraint based on state sovereignty requiring or
permitting judicial enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitution; our decisions over
the last century and a half have explicitly rejected the existence of any such restraint on the
commerce power." Id. at 858 (Brennan. J .. dissenting). The majority's construction of the
tenth amendment was a "meaningless limitation," id. at 871, "an abstraction without
substance. founded neither in the words of the Constitution nor on precedent," id. at 860,
and "a transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they disagree," id. at 867.
42
Id. at 861. 873 (Brennan, J .. dissenting).
43
Id. at 875-76. Justice Brennan concluded: "It is unacceptable that the judicial process
should be thought superior to the political process in this area. Under the Consitution the
judiciary has no role beyond finding that Congress has not made an unreasonable legislative
judgment respecting what is 'commerce.• " Id. at 876.
44
The rational basis test commonly applied to federal exercises of the commerce power
reflects an attitude of judicial deference to the legislative judgment in this area. Prior cases
have suggested that Congress has special competence in resolving conflicts engendered by
federal-state intergovernmental relations. Under this view, states should rely upon political
restraints as a check on excessive federal power with the appropriate arena for resolving
disputes as Congress rather than the Court. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 581-82
(1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I. 78-80 (1936) (Stone. J .. dissenting)(" For the removal of
unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the
processes of democratic government."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 197
(1824). See Wechsler. The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543, 558-60
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B. The Effect of the FLSA Amendments
As Applied to the States

The Supreme Court in National League also departed from
traditional commerce clause analysis by not specifically considering the constitutionality of the FLSA Amendments as applied to
the facts of the case. Instead, it engaged in a sweeping invalidation
of the statute on federalism grounds, even though the cost of
compliance and the extent of disruption in the delivery of government services resulting from the 1974 Amendments were disputed
issues. 45 The Court discussed particular allegations to support its
result, but stated that an evaluation of the actual impact was not
critical to its decision. 46 It was sufficient that the broad outline of
the 1974 Amendments "appears likely" to substantially disrupt
traditional state employment practices. 47
It is questionable whether the 1974 FLSA Amendments were
actually as broad or inflexible as Justice Rehnquist suggested. In
upholding the 1966 FLSA Amendments, the court in Maryland v.
Wirtz 48 held that wages and hours of state-operated schools and
hospitals could be regulated, because the requisite connection between these institutions and interstate commerce could be established by substantial use of interstate goods. 49 The Court noted
(1954). Professor Wechsler argues that Congress, not the Court, is vested with ultimate
authority for managing federalism. See generally Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret
Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 613-16 (1975); Freund, Umpiring
the Federal System, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 561 ( 1954); Wechsler. Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I (1959). See also Tribe, lntergol'ernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Control'ersies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 694-96 (1976). Professor Tribe contends that judicial inroads on state sovereignty, which are limited by the eleventh amendment, should be distinguished from congressional power to abrogate state soverign immunity, which is based on the "peculiar institutional competence of Congress in adjusting
federal power relationships." Id. at 696. A similar argument is found in Nowak, The Scope
of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Aciion Against State Go1•ernments and the
History of the Elel'enth and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1441-42
(1975). Professor Nowak argues that the politically unresponsive nature of the courts
prevents effective recourse from a judicial decision limiting or expanding congressional
power, and that the balancing required by federalism should be flexibly resolved by Congress.
45
Compare Complaints for Appellant National League and Appellant State of California.
with Appellant's Motion to Affirm at 8, 19-25, and Brief for Appellee at 45-53, National
League, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The three-judge district court held no evidentiary hearing and
made no factual findings. In granting defendant's motion to dismiss. however, the court
commented that it was troubled by the substantial allegations of cost and disruption contained in the plaintiffs' complaints. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826,
828 (D.D.C. 1974). The degree of intrusion appears to be a critical factor in drawing the line
between permissible and impermissible federal regulation of state activities. despite the fact
that it was not adequately assessed in the Supreme Court's majority opinion. See notes 92-97
and accompanying text infra.
46
426 U.S. at 846, 85 I.
41
Id. at 850.
48
392 u .s. 183 (1968).
49
Id. at 194. See note 20 supra.
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that where the impact of interstate government operations on interstate commerce is slight, extensive federal regulation is unjustified. 50 Nevertheless, the Court declined to decide whether a particular hospital or school actually had employees engaged in commerce, thus qualifying under the Act, or whether those institutions
fell within the Act's exemption for an "ultimate consumer" of
interstate goods.51 These possible limitations on the applicability of
the FLSA to state employees were not considered in National
League. The Court also overlooked the possibility that existing
statutory exceptions 52 might mitigate the disruptive effects of the
1974 Amendments.
The broad invalidation of the Amendments without a specific
analysis of their actual impact suggests that National League has
potentially sweeping implications with respect to all aspects of the
FLSA as applied to the states. Once a state function is found to be
essential, the majority opinion protects state wage-hour decisions
from any federal displacement, regardless of the degree of interference. The Court's failure to analyze either the financial cost at
stake or the extent of displacement of state policies makes it
difficult to ascertain how the National League rationale affects
other federal legislation involving state employment practices.
III. AMBIGUITIES OF NATIONAL LEAGUE v. USERY

A. The "Essential Government Function" Test
The National League Court held that states have a sovereign
right to operate "traditional governmental functions" free from
50

Id. at 196 n.27.
Id. at 200-01. The definition of "goods" in section 3(i) of the FLSA, 29 U .S.C. § 203 (i)
(1970), specifically excludes goods after their delivery into the physical possession of the
ultimate consumer. The importation of interstate goods by such a consumer will not qualify
the importer as an enterprise engaged in commerce. The question whether particular
governmental agencies have the requisite interstate connection to come within the Act's
coverage is discussed in Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1015 (1975). The court upheld application of the FLSA upon finding that some employees
were engaged in activities in interstate commerce, thus qualifying the entire agency as an
enterprise, and that the interstate connection was established where employees sell, handle,
or use goods which have moved in interstate commerce. The dissent argued that the
activities were purely local and should come within the "ultimate consumer" exception of
29 u.s.c. § 203(i) (1970).
52 See, in particular, the overtime exceptions for hospital employees and for police and
firemen. FLSA § 7(j), (k), 29 U.S.C. § 207(j). (k), (Supp. V 1975); § 13(b)(20), 29 U.S.C. §
213(b)(20) (Supp. V 1975). To provide additional tlexibility, the 1974 Amendments provided
for phased-in compliance with the minimum wage over a four-year period for employees
brought within the Act for the first time, FLSA § 6(b), 29 U .S.C. § 206 (Supp. V 1975). There
are exceptions to the maximum hour regulations for seasonal employment in FLSA & 7(c),
(d), 29. U.S.C. § 207(c), (d) (Supp. V 1975). Also FLSA § 13, 29 U.S.C § 213 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975), contains numerous occupational exemptions, including the broad category of
executive, administrative, or professional employees. FLSA § 14, 29 U .S.C. § 214 (Supp. V
1975), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to approve employment of ieaniers, apprentices,
students, and handicapped workers at less than the minimum wage "to the extent necessary
in order to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment."
51
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disruptive federal interference. 53 The major difficulty with this
holding is that the Court established a test which is inherently
difficult to apply, while offering little guidance as to what standards
should be embodied in the test. Relying on Fry v. United States, 54
Justice Rehnquist suggested that the tenth amendment is violated
when Congress attempts to "exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the State's integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system. " 55 When the states are engaged in "functions
essential to separate and independent existence, " 56 they are immunized from federal law under the commerce clause. The protected state enclave includes the "dual functions of administering
the public law and furnishing public services," such as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation. 57 Beyond these categories, cited by Justice Rehnquist
as "typical" but not exhaustive, it is difficult to say what state
activities are comprehended. The majority opinion does not distinguish "essential" from "traditional" state functions, and the interchangeable use of these terms becomes especially imprecise when
applied to dynamically expanding governmental activity.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether state governmental activities
are absolutely immunized from federal laws enacted pursuant to
the commerce clause 58 or are only exempted from regulations
which displace the states' ability to "structure" employeremployee relationships. The latter proposition requires drawing a
second line, once an essential government function has been identified, between laws which interfere with the employment structure
and those which do not. 59 Although a narrow reading of National
53

426 U.S. at 852.
421 U.S. 542 (1975).
426 U.S. at 843, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7.
56
/d. at 845. The language is drawn from Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869) (power of taxation is an essential state function), quoted in Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559, 580 (191 I). Justice Rehnquist quotes the Coyle Court's illustration of an "essentially
and peculiarly" state power - the power to locate and appropriate public funds for a state
capitol.
57
426 U.S. at 851 & n. 16. The opinion does not identify a common denominator for these
activities: "While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved
in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion
of those governmental seivices which the States and their political subdivisions have
traditionally afforded their citizens." Id. at 855.
58
The Court declined to decide whether Congress may affect integral state governmental
operations under the spending power or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 852 &
n.17. Federal intrusion may be permissible pursuant to the war power, see discussion of
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), at notes 99- JOO and accompanying text infra; or in the
context of a national emergency, see discussions of United States v. Fry, 421 U.S. 542
(1975), at notes 86-91 and accompanying text infra.
59
.ln Elrod v. Bums, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976), the Court held that public employees, discharged as a result of the political patronage system of state employment, were deprived of
constitutional rights secured by the first and fourteenth amendments. Chief Justice Burger
argued in dissent that the decision interfered with legislative and policy matters better left to
the States and to Congress at the federal level. He suggested that National League's
54

55
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League would mean only that Congress cannot interfere with the
wages and hours of employees carrying on essential and traditional
state activities, most of the decision's language is cast in broader
terms. The decision invokes the tenth amendment as a constitutional barrier against federal commerce clause regulations which
disrupt the delivery of essential state services. It is unclear what
federal legislation, other than wage-hour regulation, may be invalidated under this rationale.
In support of the concept of an enclave of immune state activities, Justice Rehnquist drew on precedents associated with the
theory of implied intergovernmental tax immunity. 60 In attempting
to limit the broad immunity of states from federal taxation, the
Court had developed a distinction between a state's "governmental" activities, which enjoyed tax immunity, and its "proprietary"
activities, which were subject to federal taxation. 61 Helvering v.
Gerhardt 62 further restricted the states' reciprocal immunity,
permitting it only where the function involved was "essential to the
maintenance of a state government." 63 In New York v. United
States, 64 which upheld a federal tax on the state's sale of its
mineral waters, it was conceded that there was a limited area of
tax-immune activities uniquely characteristic of the states, but the
Court was divided in its analysis of the issue. 65 Nevertheless, the

prohibition of federal "inroads on the powers of the States to manage their own affairs"
should control the result in Elrod. Id. at 2690-91.
60 Derived from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). this theory supported intergovernmental tax immunity until the late
1930's. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Alabama v. King & Boozer,
314 U.S. I (1941); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931);
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) I 13 (1871). See McCormack, Intergovernmental
Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REV. 485 (1973); Powell, The Waning of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1945); Powell, The Remnant of
Tax Intergovernmental Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1945); Tribe, supra note 44.
61
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (state-operated street railway taxed); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (state liquor business taxed); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (same).
62 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
63 Id. at 417. If the activity could be carried on by a private enterprise, it did not qualify
under Gerhardt as a function essential to the state as a governmental entity. The Gerhardt
Court rejected the argument that the increased economic burden of federal taxation unconstitutionally infringed upon state sovereignty:
Even though, to some unascertainable extent, the tax deprives the states of the
advantage of paying less than the standard rate for the services which they engage,
it does not curtail any of those functions which have been thought hitherto to be
essential to their continued existence as states. At most it may be said to increase
somewhat the cost of the state governments ....
Id. at 420.
64 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
65 Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Rutledge, announced the opinion of the Court;
Rutledge also filed a separate concurrence. Justice Stone.joined by Justices Reed, Murphy,
and Burton, wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black,
filed a dissenting opiniof!.
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governmental-proprietary distinction was firmly rejected by a
majority of the Court as an unworkable test. 66
Even if the demarcation techniques of the intergovernmental tax
immunity theory were agreed upon by the Court and capable of
application, they were traditionally applied successfully only to
exercises of the federal taxing power. Until National League, state
claims to immunity from federal regulatory control under the
commerce clause had not been accepted. 67 In United States v.
California, 68 the leading case in this area prior to National League,
a distinction was articulated between the federal taxing power,
which is subject to a limited state immunity, and the federal commerce clause power, which is plenary. Upholding the application .
of the statutory penalties of the Federal Safety Appliance Act to a
state-operated railway, the Court rejected the state's argument that
it was immune from federal regulation when acting in a sovereign
capacity. 69 Furthermore, the Court considered the analogy of state
immunity to federal taxation to be inappropriate where commerce
clause regulations are involved as in this case:
[We] look to the activities in which the states have traditionally
engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the
federal taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the
plenary power to regulate Commerce. The state can no more
deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress
than can an individual. 70
66
Justice Frankfurter dismissed the governmental-proprietary distinction as "untenable"
and argued that the tax immunity should be limited to sources of revenue "uniquely capable
of being earned only by a State." 326 U.S. at 582-83. Justice Stone, whose opinon was relied
upon by the majority in National League, 426 U.S. at 843 & nn.13-14, also rejected the
governmental-proprietary distinction, but he suggested that even nondiscriminatory taxes
applied equally to private persons and the state may .unconstitutionally interfere with the
state's performance of its sovereign functions. Justice Stone suggested, for example, that a
nondiscriminatory property tax could not be applied to the state's capitol, its statehouse, its
public school houses, or public parks. Id. at 587-88. This illustration is noted by Justice
Rehnquist in the majority opinion in National League, 426 U.S. at 843. Justice Brennan,
dissenting in National League, regarded New York v. United States. 326 U.S. 572 (1946), as
inapposite, because it dealt with limitations applicable only to the federal taxing power and
not to the commerce power, 426 U.S. at 863-64. Moreover, he argued that even the state's
tax immunity was severely limited, in Justice Frankfurter's view, to taxes which discriminate against the states. Id. at 866 n.7.
61
See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (overruled in National League): Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), and United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (all harmonized in National League); Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (distinguished in National League). See note 36 supra.
68
297 u .s. 175 (1936).
69
The Court stated:
The only question we need consider is whether the exercise of that power, in
whatever capacity, must be in subordination to the power to regulate interstate
commerce, which has been granted specifically to the national government. The
sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of
power to the federal government in the Constitution.
Id. at 183-84.
70
Id. at 185.
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The Court relied upon the California analysis in Maryland v.
Wirtz 11 in order to conclude that the 1966 FLSA Amendments
permissibly subjected the states to the same restrictions applied to
a wide range of private employers whose operations affect commerce. The Wirtz Court held that the federal government, pursuant
to the delegated commerce power, "may override countervailing
state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or
'proprietary' in character. " 72 Provided that the law constitutes an
otherwise valid regulation of commerce, the principle of California
was held to be "controlling. " 73
While it rejected the California distinction between limitations
on the federal taxing power and those on the commerce power, 74
the National League Court did not overrule California. Because
state operation of a railroad was considered not to be within the
immune sphere of integral state activities, 75 the distinction between the reach of the federal taxing and commerce powers became superfluous. 76 The Court construed the federal commerce
power as limited by the same state sovereignty restraint tradition-

71

392 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1968). See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
392 U.S. at 195.
Id. at 198. The Court concluded:
This Court has examined and will continue to examine federal statutes to determine
whether there is a rational basis for regarding them as regulations of commerce
among the States. But it will not carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce from private businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be run by the States for the benefit of their
citizens.
Id. at 198-99.
74
The majority opinion stated: "(W)e have reaffirmed today that the States as States
stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the
exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. We think the dicta from United States v.
California simply wrong." 426 U.S. at 854-55, citing United States v. California, 297 U.S. at
185, quoted in text accompanying note 70 supra.
75
National League, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. The same reasoning is used by the National
League majority to reconcile Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and California v.
Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), both of which applied the California rule. Some contrary
language appears in Parden, however, where the Court held that by adopting and ratifying
the commerce clause which empowered Congress to regulate commerce, the states "necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such
regulation." 377 U.S. at 192. The state is subject to federal regulation equally with private
persons if it engages in activity regulated by Congress and not within the sphere of "exclusively" state activities. Id. at 196-97. See National League, 426 U.S. at 870 n.11 & 871
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
76
The distinction between the taxing and commerce powers was not "dicta" in the
California opinion; in the face of the state's assertion that the railroad was a sovereign
activity, the Court found that it was not necessary to decide whether the railroad was a
sovereign activity or not because, in its view, even sovereign state activities must yield to
valid regulations of interstate commerce. California, 297 U.S. at 183-84.
Other precedents sustaining the federal regulatory power against state claims to immunity
were also dismissed by the National League Court. The irreconcilable holding and" reasoning" in Wirtz were overruled. 426 U.S. at 840, 853-54. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946),
was distinguished as an exercise of the war power. Id. at 854 n. 18.
72

73
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ally applied to the federal taxing power, 77 and it applied the intergovernmental tax immunity precedents to support its result.
Although cases prior to National League had sharply distinguished the federal taxing and commerce powers in terms of state
immunity, the legitimacy of the distinction has not been carefully
analyzed. Federal exercises of both powers may involve serious
interferences with the institutional autonomy and fiscal integrity of
the states and may present similar problems in reconciling competing interests of the states and the federal government. There are
perhaps justifiable, even though unarticulated, grounds for the
majority's assimilation of the implications for federalism involved
in these two powers. The majority opinion, however, does not
offer a principled analysis of its realignment of precedents.
Further, even if the taxing and commerce powers should be similarly construed in terms of their impact on state sovereignty, the
Court did not satisfactorily explain why the controlling interpretation should be supplied by the intergovernmental tax immunity
cases, which failed to develop any workable test for determining
which state activities are properly subject to federal interference. 78
The rational basis review used in the commerce clause precedents
provides as justifiable an approach while recognizing the institutional competence of Congress in resolving conflicts in the federal
system. 79
As an alternative to overruling Wirtz, the cities and states in
National League argued that Wirtz might be limited to state activities in competition with the private sector, such as schools and
hospitals, and that a different rule could be developed for essential
government functions uniquely performed by the state, such as

77

The two immunities are held to be derived from a common source:
Surely the federal power to tax is no less a delegated power than is the commerce
power: both find their genesis in Art. I. § 8. Nor can characterizing the limitation
recognized upon the federal taxing power as an "implied immunity" obscure the
fact that this "immunity" is derived from the sovereignty of the States and the
concomitant barriers which such sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary federal
authority.
426 U.S. at 843-44 n.14.
78 See note 161 and accompanying text infra. Justice Brennan criticized the majority's use
of the intergovernmental tax immunity analogy concluding:
That no precedent justifies today's result is particularly clear from the awkward
extension of the doctrine of state immunity from federal taxation-an imm_unity
conclusively distinguished by Mr. Justice Stone in California, and an immunity that
is "narrowly limited" because "the people of all the states have created the
national government and are represented in Congress," Helvering v. Gerhardt
...-to fashion a judicially enforceable restraint on Congress' exercise of the
commerce power that the Court has time and again rejected as having no place in
our constitutional jurisprudence.
Id. at 869-70.
79
See Tribe, supra note 44, at 700-13.
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police and fire protection. 80 Such a restriction of Wirtz would have
raised difficult questions concerning which state activities are in
competition with the private sector. Declining to use this criterion,
the National League Court overruled Wirtz. Thus, activities carried on competitively or concurrently by government and private
parties may be drawn within the area of immunity, if performed by
the state and qualifying as essential functions under National
League, regardless of the state's competitive advantage in its freedom to pay substandard wages.
National League does not offer functional standards for determining which state functions are immune; the "essential," "traditional," and "governmental" categories have been used interchangeably to refer to an undefined sphere which the Court will
have to more clearly delineate. 81 The historical standard of what
functions have "traditionally" been performed by states is inadequate in identifying those functions that are essential to the
states' separate existence. In an era of dynamically expanding
governmental activity, "essential" state functions should be defined by flexible standards sensitive to shifting demands on state
and local governments. Under the National League decision, however, the scope of protected state activities must be determined
constitutionally by the courts, rather than politically by Congress. 82 In view of the failure of the National League Court to
provide criteria for identifying immune state functions, applying
the essential function test will necessarily involve policy judgments
which will vary with individual justice's views of what is "essential" or "traditional."
B. An Ad Hoc Balancing Test?
The National League majority mechanically defined state
sovereign immunity in terms of the nature of the activity displaced
by federal regulation without weighing the countervailing federal
policy involved in the FLSA. Several factors suggest, however,
• 0 Brief for Appellant National League at 18, 26, and Brief for Appellant State of California at 45-47, National League, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The district court had also noted the
possibility of limiting Wirtz in this respect. National League v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826,
827 (D.D.C. 1974).
81 The difficulty of ascertaining immune state functions was recognized by Justice Rehnquist in Fry v. United States:
It is conceivable that the traditional distinction between "governmental" and
"proprietary" activities might in some form prove useful in such line drawing. The
distinction suggested in New York v. United States ... between activities traditionally undertaken by the State and other activities might also be of service,
although it too was specifically rejected in California.
421 U.S. 542,558 n.2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974).
82 See notes 4;\-44 and accompanying text supra.
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that the National League test may be more flexible than a literal
reading of the majority opinion might indicate.
The fifth vote required for a majority was supplied by Justice
Blackmun, 83 who, in a separate concurrence, stated that he joined
the opinion of the Court only with the understanding that the Court
was adopting a "balancing approach." In his view, state sovereign
immunity yielded to a paramount federal power in areas where the
federal interest is greater and where state compliance with imposed
federal standards is essential. 84 A balancing process, through
which state immunity can be overridden, modifies the idea that
federal regulation cannot pierce the "constitutional barrier" surrounding essential state functions. It is not clear, however, what
standards would be used to identify a paramount federal interest. 85
The strong federal policy expressed in the wage-hour regulations of
the FLSA of eliminating substandard labor conditions and disruptive labor disputes was apparently not a sufficiently important
federal interest to displace state decisions as shown by the decision
reached in National League.
Support for a balancing test is also found in National League's
approval of Fry v. United States. 86 The Court in Fry upheld the
application of federal wage and salary controls to state employees
pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. 87 Unrestrained
wage increases would have significantly affected interstate commerce and impaired the effectiveness of federal action to combat a
nationwide economic problem. Holding that under the commerce
clause Congress may regulate even purely intrastate activity where
the aggregate impact of like conduct affects interstate commerce,
the Court rejected the argument that the federal wage controls
impermissibly interfered with sovereign state functions. The tenth
amendment was held to prohibit only federal regulation which
interferes with the states' "ability to function effectively in a federal system. " 88

83

426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J .• concurring). See note 22 supra.
Id. Justice Blackmun cited only one specific example-environmental protection.
85
Justice Brennan. in dissent. criticized Justice Blackmun's balancing approach as a
"thinly veiled rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that our system of
government reserves to Congress." Id. at 876 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 852-53. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in Fry calling for a reconsideration of United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz. 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent is similar in structure and reasoning to his opinion
for the Court in National League. Because Justice Rehnquist would have invalidated the Fry
regulations on grounds similar to those articulated in National League, and because every
other member of the National League majority approved the Fry result. the Fry case is an
important key to the implications of the National League case. See notes 89-91 and
accompanying text infra.
87
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1970).
88
421 U.S. at 547-48. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
84
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As construed in National League, 89 the result in Fry turned on
three critical factors. First, the statute there was an emergency
measure enacted to counter a national problem peculiarly susceptible to a federal solution. Second, the federal interference was
temporary and only mildly intrusive on state interests. Third, the
purpose and effect of the regulation was to relieve rather than
increase the fiscal burdens on the states. Both National League
and Fry dealt with commerce clause wage regulations directed at
the state as an employer. Although Fry upheld a federal ceiling on
state salaries, while National League involved the imposition of a
minimum floor, both infringed upon the same prerogative of the
states to structure pay scales. 90 These cases, however, are distinguishable on the grounds of the federal interest involved and the
degree of federal intrusion on state interests. Taking National
League in conjunction with Fry, it becomes apparent that the tenth
amendment argument is, as Blackmun understood it, a question of
balancing rather than a rigid demarcation of a protected state
enclave. Accordingly, a national problem, which requires a uniform federal solution, and which does not displace legitimate state
choices or impose disruptive financial burdens, may foreclose the
tenth amendment issue, as it did in Fry. 91
Although the extent to which the National League Court considered the degree of federal intrusion is unclear, 92 state financial
burdens have usually been considered irrelevant where federal
policy implementation is involved. 93 Although the majority opinion
stated that resolution of the disputed cost issue is not critical to the
decision, 94 it concluded that the financial cost of the FLSA
89

426 U.S. at 852-53.
It is difficult to draw a legitimate constitutional distinction between the federal power to
prohibit wage increases and the federal power to force them above a minimum level.
91
421 U.S. at 548.
92
See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
93 Oklahoma v. Guy F. "Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,528 (1941); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago
v. United States, 266 U.S. 405,432 (1925); Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100, 104 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970). See also the treatment of the increased economic
burden of federal taxation in the United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469, 472
(1958); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 483-86 (1939); Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 420-21 (1938).
In the context of eleventh amendment immunity from suit under the FLSA, the Court
stated:
Where employees in state institutions not conducted for profit have such a relation
to interstate commerce that national policy, of which Congress is the keeper,
indicates that their status should be raised, Congress can act. And when Congress
does act, it may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States.
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 41_1 U.S. 279, 284 (1973). But cf Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974), approving Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973) (cost to state of retroactive payments for improperly
withheld welfare funds balanced against, and found to outweigh, benefit to recipient).
94
426 U.S. at 846, 851. Justice Rehnquist stated that an "outline discussion" of the
"general import" of the 1974 FLSA Amendments, ratherthan "particularized" assessments
90
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Amendments amounted to a "significant impact. " 95 In addition, the
Court predicted other adverse effects, such as the curtailment of
governmental services and the substantial restructuring of work
periods and existing employment practices. 96 The Fry Court had
suggested that some minimal threshold level of federal interference
is tolerable, at least where reasonably related to a national problem
requiring a federal solution. But the National League Court failed
to analyze the precise impact of the FLSA Amendments, or even
to consider such an inquiry necessary to its result leaving uncertain
the quantum of federal interference necessary to trigger the tenth
amendment. 97
A further factor supporting a more flexible reading of the National League test is that the test applies only where an exercise
of the commerce clause affronts state sovereignty. The Court
expressed no view concerning whether the same result would be
reached if Congress sought to interfere with state sovereign functions pursuant to the spending power or section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. 98 In distinguishing Case v. Bowles, 99 the Court also
refused to address the scope of the federal war power. 100 While the
of actual impact, was all that was necessary to show an impermissible federal instrusion. He
maintained that, even under the federal government's assessments, the states' ability to
structure employment relations was significantly displaced. Id. at 851.
95
Id. at 846. Based on a 1970 feasibility study by the Department of Labor, Congress
predicted the impact of the 1974 Amendments to be "virtually non-existent" in view.of the
overtime exemption for police and firemen, 29 U .S.C. § 207(j), (k) (Supp. V 1975). H.R.
REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS
281 I, 2838. See note 52 supra. Justice Brennan argued in his National League dissent that
the appellants' allegations exaggerated and misapplied the Amendments. 426 U.S. at 874
n.12. He further claimed tht the plurality's refusal to rely on the cost-of-compliance factor
produced a broad rule capable of invalidating any federal regulation, however insignificant
the cost. / d. at 874-75.
96
426 U.S. at 846-52.
97
The briefs of the appellants proposed that the decision be made in a commerce clause
context but that the court use a stricter standard of review than the traditional rational basis
test. Brief for Appellant National League at 46-47, 96-108, and Brief for Appellant State of
California at 23-24, National League, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Under this view, the tenth
amendment, construed as a fundamental right, would increase the burden on the government to justify the law by a compelling federal interest, analogous to the standard of judicial
review of suspect classifications in equal protection cases. The National League majority
opinion, however, pursued a different route to invalidation by avoiding the commerce clause
altogether. The Court focused on the nature of the displaced state function, without specifying what burden must be borne by a state challenging a federal regulation or what legitimate
state interests can override the congressional judgment.
98
426 U.S. at 852 n.17. For a discussion of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment see part
V. B. infra.
99
327 u .s. 92 (1946).
100
426 U.S. at 854-55 n.18. The Court in Case upheld the application of the price
restraints of the Emergency Price Control Act to the sale of timber by the state of Washington for the support of its public schools. The state argued that the federal war power did not
extend to the state's exercise of ''essential government functions,'' such as raising revenue
for the support of education. 327 U.S at IOI. The Court rejected this criterion as unworkable, citing United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), and New York v. United States
326 U.S 572 (1946). Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that Congress has adequate
power to accomplish the full purpose of a delegated power including all appropriate means
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specific holding in National League is limited to an invalidation of
commerce clause legislation, the opinion offers no logical grounds
for precluding the extension of its tenth amendment analysis to
exercises of other delegated powers. If the tenth amendment is an
affirmative constitutional limitation on the commerce power, it is
not clear why it would not be an equally effective limitation where
a different federal constitutional power is asserted.
IV. THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: BACKGROUND

A. The Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act of 19631° 1 forbids sex discrimination in the
payment of wages to employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. The EPA,
enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, is based upon a congressional finding that sex-based wage differentials have a substantial,
adverse impact on interstate commerce. 102 Adding to the FLSA a
fair labor standard requiring equal pay for equal work, 103 the EPA
is broadly remedial. 104 The EPA employs the remedies and enplainly adapted to that end. Id. at 102. The Court considered the tenth amendment as not
operating as a limitation upon the express or implied power granted to the federal government.
The Court in National League distinguished the war power involved in Case from the
commerce clause power stating that to sustain state immunity in Case would " 'impair a
prime purpose of the Federal Government's establishment.' " 426 U.S. at 855 n.18, quoting
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. at 102. Justice Brennan, dissenting in National League, argued
that Case, not the New York analysis of intergovernmental tax immunity, was the proper
precedent for the questions presented in National League. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
101
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970)). 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(I) (1970) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the 'basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex. . . .
102
Section 2 of the Equal Pay Act of 1%3, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
103 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1970).
10
• See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug
Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); Hodgson v. Square D
Co., 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. %7 (1972); Hodgson v. Miller
Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972); Shultz v American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d
356 (8th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'! Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1%9);
Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the Law for
Women, 5 VAL. L. REV. 326 (1971); Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the
Equal Pay Act 1963-70, 39 U. CINN. L. REV. 615 (1970).
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forcement procedures of the FLSA 105 but is limited to the FLSA
coverage of employees entitled to the federal minimum wage. 106
The purpose of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 is similar to that of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 107 Although there is an
overlap in coverage, Title VII was not intended to preempt the
EPA, 108 which continues to provide a narrower remedy for sexbased wage differentials. 109 The EPA is harmonious in purpose
with Title VII and has been construed so as not to undermine the
broader Act. 110 Title VII is not limited by the EPA's coverage, its
definition of equal work, or its statutory exceptions. 111 Rather, it
105
29 U .S.C. §§ 216-217 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note 9 supra. By tying the Equal Pay
Act to the FLSA, Congress intended to take advantage of the established enforcement
procedures and existing interpretations of the FLSA. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., I st
Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1%3] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687, 688.
106
The extension of the coverage of FLSA effected by the FLSA Amendments of 1%6,
Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830, and by the 1974 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.
55, applied equally to the EPA.
107
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)). Section 703(a), 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), provides that it shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's ... sex .... "
108
Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) deals specifically with the
relationship to the EPA; a wage differentiation authorized by the EPA will not be considered
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) Sex Discrimination Guidelines state that the coverage of Title VII is
broader than the EPA, which is limited by the reach of the FLSA. A defense based upon the
EPA may be raised in a proceeding under Title VII, in which case the EEOC will give
appropriate consideration to, but will not be bound by, the Department of Labor's interpretation of the EPA. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1975). See Piva v. Xerox Corp., 376 F. Supp. 242
(N .D. Cal. 1974); Herbert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating
Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 449, 450 (1971); Kanowitz, Sex-Based
Discrimination in American Law Ill: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.J. 305, 344 (1968); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 885 (1972). See also
Larson, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in State and Local Government Employment:
A Survey and Analysis, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 335, 345-46 (1973).
10
• Sape & Hart, supra note 108, at 85 I. The EPA initially enjoyed more effective
remedies than those provided for Title VII, but the 1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act
have minimized the differences by providing more effective enforcement powers for the
EEOC under§ 706, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. V 1975)).
uo E.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970), where the court stated that the EPA and Title VII are "in pari materia,"
both serving the same fundamental purpose, with the result that the exceptions to the EPA
should be broadly construed so as not to undermine Title VII. Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill &
Son, Inc., 51 I F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v.
ZIA Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1971); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d
719, 727 (5th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'! Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 658-59 (5th Cir.
1969). Kanowitz, supra note 108, at 350; Landau & Dunahoo, Sex Discrimination in
Employment: A Survey of State and Federal Remedies, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 417, 497-99
(1971).
An example of the close interrelationship between the EPA and Title VII is provided in
the recent Supreme Court decision in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U .S.L. W. 4031 (Dec.
7, 1976). The Court stated that interpretations of the EPA are applicable to Title VII and
further suggested that, in construing Title VII, the legislative history and intefPretive
regulations of the EPA take precedence over more recent EEOC Guidelines interpreting
Title VII.
111
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I) (1970); see note 101 supra.
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establishes an independent statutory remedy 112 which covers more
types of discrimination.
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967113 prohibits
employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from discriminating on the basis of age against individuals between the ages
of forty and sixty-five in matters of hiring, job retention, compensation, and other terms and conditions or privileges of employment. The purpose of the Act is to promote the employment of
older persons on the basis of their ability rather than age, to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment, and to assist
employers and workers in dealing with the problems arising from
the impact of age on employment. 114 Like the EPA, the ADEA was
enacted pursuant to commerce clause authority and is based on
legislative findings that arbitrary age discrimination "burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods. " 115 The ADEA is enforced
in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided
in the FLSA. 116
Although age discrimination was not prohibited in Title VII, 11 7
the ADEA parallels Title VII in its fundamental purpose to ensure
and promote employment without regard to arbitrary criteria.
There are also a number of structural similarities between the two
statutes. 118 Accordingly, the courts have used Title VII precedents
to construe the provisions of the ADEA.11 9
1
u H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ao. NEWS 2137, 2154; Piva v. Xerox Corp., 376 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Herbert &
Reischel, supra note 108, at 450-51.
113
Pub. L. No. 90.202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
11
• 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
11
• 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1970).
116
29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note 9 supra. Before suit can be brought,
however, the statute requires that an attempt at voluntary compliance be made by the
Secretary of Labor through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). See Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
117
Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970), authorized the
Secretary of Labor to investigate and make specific recommendations concerning age
discrimination in employment. The report, The Older American Worker-Age Discrimination in Employment, submitted June 30, 1965, documented widespread age discrimination.
The ADEA was passed December 6, 1%7. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2,
reprinted in (1967) U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2213, 2214.
118 The court in Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 445 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir.
1972), noted, "With a few minor exceptions the prohibitions of this enactment are in terms
identical to those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 except that 'age' has been
substituted for 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Accord, Morelock v. NCR
Corp., 14 FEP Cases (BNA) 65- 68 (6th Cir. 1976); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617,
620 (D. Kan. 1973).
119
See, e.g., Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975), Burgett v.
Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973), and Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co., 62
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V. THE EFFECT OF THE HOLDING IN NATIONAL LEAGUE
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE EPA
AND THE ADEA TO THE STATES

A. Remaining Validity under the Commerce Clause
The decision in National League invalidated the minimum wage
and maximum hours provisions of the 1974 FLSA Amendments
insofar as they interfered with essential state functions. While
National League does not seem to limit the FLSA, the EPA, and
the ADEA where nonessential or nontraditional governmental activities are involved, it is not clear how the decision will affect the
application of the EPA and the AD EA to essential state functions.
The Court did not discuss either the EPA or the ADEA, 120 and it is
submitted here that, unlike the FLSA wage-hour regulations involved in National League, the extension of the EPA and the
ADEA to essential state functions should not be invalidated under
the National League rationale.
F.R.D. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (cases construing the provision requiring notice of intent to sue,
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970) of ADEA and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(t) (Supp. V 1975) of Title
VII). Courts have also used Title VII precedents to construe the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) exception of the ADEA. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 449 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Concerning the right to a jury trial in ADEA cases, see
Morelock v. NCR Corp., 14 FEP Cases (BNA) 65 (6th Cir. 1976). The burden of proof
established in Title VII actions is also used widely in ADEA actions. Hodgson v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); Bisl}op v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 579
(D.D.C. 1974). Cf. Laugeson v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975) (unwilling to
apply Title VII burden of proof automatically to ADEA jury trial).
The ADEA and Title VII have been similarly construed. See Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 OUQ. L.
REv. 227, 247 (1974); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief,
II CoLVM. J. LAW & Soc. PRoB. 281,289, 295-96, 301-03, 308 (1975); Note, Procedural
Aspects of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 914,922;
926-27 (1975); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally
Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 131 I, 1328 (1974).
In several respects the ADEA is a more limited remedial statute than Title VII. It has
more liberal bona fide seniority and merit exceptions, 29 U .S.C. § 623(t) (1970), and it
applies only to persons in the 40-65 age group, 29 U .S.C. § 631 (Supp. V 1975). See Weiss v.
Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afj'd mem., 461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: The Problem of the
Worker Over Sixty-Five, 5 RITT.-CAM. L.J. 484 (1974). While the purpose of the ADEA is
generally viewed as similar to that of Title VII, some courts have differentiated the two acts
by giving the procedural aspects of the ADEA a less liberal construction. See, e.g., Edwards
v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d I 195 (5th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th
Cir. 1975); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L._ REv. 380
(1976); Note, State Deferral of Complaints Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 51° NOTRE DAME LAW. 492 (1976) [hereinafter cited as State Deferral of Complaints].
120 The appellants broadly framed their challenge to include the EPA and ADEA, but the
issues presented by these acts were never argued. The opinion of the three-judge district
court also did not mention the EPA and the ADEA. National League of Cities v. Brennan,
406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
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Several federal district courts have considered the question
whether National League restricts federal power to require state
compliance with the EPA 121 and the ADEA. 122 These courts have
uniformly upheld the constitutionality of applying these acts to
state employees, either as independent assertions of the federal
commerce power, severable from the wage-hour regulations of
FLSA, 123 or as valid congressional implementations of the fourteenth amendment. 124 These cases have involved hospitals, universities, or school districts, all of which are expressly immunized
from FLSA wage-hour regulations under the essential state function test of National League . 125
The National League opinion suggests that the sovereign state
rights it protects may ·be narrowly defined:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States'
power to determine the wages which shall be p_aid to those
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental
functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may be
called upon to work overtime. The question we must resolve,
then, is whether these determinations are•"functions essential
to separate and independent existence," ... so that Congress
may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary authority to
make them. 126

It is not entirely clear whether the National League decision protects the states from federal regulation where they are engaged in
delivering essential services or where they are determining wage
rates and hourly schedules in state employment. It appears to

121
Usery v. Allegheny County Hosp. Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 1188 (3d Cir. 1976);
Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 45 U.S.L.W. 2351 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1977); Usery v.
Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1976);
Usery v. University of Texas at El Paso, 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1388 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14,
1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Washoe County School Dist., 22 WH Cases
(BNA) 1373 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Fort Madison
Community School Dist., No. C-75-62-1 (S.D. Iowa Sept. I, 1976) (motion to dismiss
denied); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 634 (S.D. Iowa
Sept. 1, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., No.
76-249 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied); Usery v. Sioux City Community
School Dist., No. C-76-4024 (N .0. Iowa Aug. 20, 1976)(motion to dismiss denied); Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 161 (N .0. Iowa Aug. 4, 1976) (motion to dismiss denied).
122 Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEPCases(BNA) 717 (0. Utah Sept. 1,
1976); Riley v. University of Lowell, Civ. No. 76-1118-M (0. Mass, July 22, 1976)(motion to
dismiss denied).
123 The severability provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970) provides: "If any
provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter and the application of such provision to other
persons or circumstances shall not be aflected thereby."
124
See part V. B. infra.
125
426 U.S. at 855.
126
Id. at 845-46.
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immunize certain employment decisions, such as wages and hours,
within certain state functions characterized as essential or traditional. The Court relies only upon examples of the disruptive effect
of federal wage-hour regulation in reaching the conclusion that the
FLSA Amendments impose a substantial fiscal burden and displace state employment decisions. 127 The opinion did not consider
whether employment discrimination in essential state functions is a
sovereign right included within the Court's immunization of "accepted employment practices" 128 or "considered policy
choices" 129 of the states. 130
If National League is viewed as creating an ad hoc balancing
test, in which the degree of federal intrusion and the federal policy
implemented by the regulation are weighed against the state interest involved, 131 the particular balance struck in National League
between wage-hour regulations and states' fiscal and governmental
integrity may be distinguished from the balance implicated in the
application of EPA and ADEA to the states. 132 Even if these acts
are potentially disruptive of state sovereignty under the National
League rationale, the degree of interference and the particular
interests involved should shift the balance in favor of upholding
their applicability to the states. 133

127

Id. at 845-52.
Id. at 850.
12
• Id. at 848.
130
In Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 161. 163 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 4, 1976), the
court stated that sex discrimination should not be included within any of the court's
formulations of immunized state activities because the right to discriminate is not a "fundamental employment decision," an "attribute of sovereignty," or a "function essential to
separate and independent existence of the states." See Brown v. County of Santa Barbara,
45 U.S.L.W. 2351, 2352 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1977); Usery v. University of Texas at El Paso, 22
WH Cases (BNA) 1388, 1389 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 1976); Usery v. Bettendorf Community
School Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 634. 635 (S.D. Iowa Sept. I, 1976). The court in Usery v.
Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377, 1377-79 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19,
1976), stressed the independent integrity of the EPA, the fact that it was passed separately
and was based on a distinct legislative history, and the fact that the FLSA provides for the
severability of its provisions, concluding that the state actions protected by National
League are limited to "internal, administrative, management or housekeeping functions,"
such as wage-hour decisions. Id. at 1379. See Usery v. Allegheny County, 13 FEP Cases
(BNA) at 2252.
131
See part III. B. supra.
132
The failure of the majority opinion to expressly adopt a balancing approach leaves
obscure the question of what standards would be used if it did. The only guide to predicting
what types of federal regulation could override state sovereign immunity is the Court's
analysis of Fry and its subsequent decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976),
discussed at notes 144-48 and accompanying text infra.
133
See, e.g., Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377,
1379-80 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 1976), where the court suggested that a substantial federal
intrusion is required to justify tenth amendment immunity and that the state interest may be
overridden by a strong federal interest. The EPA's interference with the sovereignty of a
state employer is justified under the balancing process suggested by the National League
endorsement of Fry, 426 U.S. at 852-53, and by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, 426
U.S. at 856. The court in Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, I 3 FEP Cases (BNA)
128
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Although linked to the FLSA to facilitate enforcement, the EPA
and the ADEA were enacted separately from the FLSA and were
based upon independent congressional assessments of the adverse
impact of sex and age discrimination in employment. The EPA and
the ADEA reflect a strong federal policy against employment discrimination, analogous to the policy pursued in Title VIl. 134 These
acts should not be included in the National League invalidation of
the FLSA Amendments, especially in view of the absence of any
specific reference to them by the Court and the differing federal
interests involved. 135 The impact on state budgetary priorities is
less severe with the EPA and the ADEA than with the FLSA
requirements of a floor on all wages paid and a minimum rate for
overtime. These acts do not require a restructuring of "work
patterns" in the sense used in the National League opinion. The
references in the opinion to the protected state right to "structure"
employment relations are illustrated by examples of the conflict
between FLSA wage-hour regulations and various local alternatives to the minimum wage and premium overtime. The effect of
federal preemption of state decisions in this area is either to impose
a substantial economic burden on state governments or to force
relinquishment of important governmental activities. The purpose
and effect of the EPA and the ADEA are distinguishable under this
rationale. These acts require only that the terms and conditions of
employment chosen by the states be extended equally to all
employees regardless of age or sex. 136 Like the wage controls
717, 718 (D. Utah Sept. 1, 1976), similarly construed National League to require a balancing
approach permitting the significant federal interest incorporated in the ADEA to override a
state claim of immunity. An "absolute interpretation" which insulates essential state functions from any federal intrusion would undermine congressional power to protect statutorily
individual employment rights.
134
See part IV. supra. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
41 I U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1%8); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th
Cir. 1971); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); Shultz v.'Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-24,
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2355, 2362-77; Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws. 2137, 2139-41, 2152-54.
135 See Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377, 1378 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 19, 1976), where the court stated: "While National League of Cities does effect a
modest resurrection of state sovereignty, this court doubts in the absence of any further
indication from the Supreme Court, that National League of Cities is intended to generally
and fundamentally alter the balance of state and federal powers."
136 The court in Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 717, 719
(D. Utah Sept. I, 1976), argued that the "minimal" degree of intrusion involved in compliance with the ADEA is a factor in the balancing process. The ADEA "imposes a limited
negative obligation on the state employer not to arbitrarily use age as an employment
criterion, however the remaining criteria may be structured, rather than an affirmative
obligation to totally restructure an integral state operation." Id. at 719. It also distinguished
the ADEA from wage-hour regulations as merely an "indirect" intrusion, not a direct
displacement of state employment relations prohibited under National League. Id.
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upheld in Fry, the fiscal burden, the interference with the state
prerogative to determine employment relations, and the federal
policy implicated in the EPA and the ADEA distinguish these acts
from the wage-hour regulations invalidated in National League.
The decision's rationale supporting state freedom to fashion flexible alternatives to the wage-hour structure of FLSA does not
justify discretion at the state or local level to discriminate in public
employment on the basis of age or sex. 137
While the EPA and the ADEA are distinguishable from the
wage-hour regulations specifically invalidated in National League,
the majority's sweeping rationale has disturbing implications. Even
if the National League decision cannot be read to invalidate the
application of these acts to state employees, a more difficult question is whether the construction given the tenth amendment by the
majority will be applied in other contexts to limit the reach of
federal legislation. If the tenth amendment functions as an affirmative limitation on federal regulations which disrupt either state
fiscal determinations or state policy choices, the theory of National League could logically be developed to reach a wide range of
federal legislation. In fact, the Court's rationale could even be
applied to the EPA and the ADEA though their antidiscrimination
standards arguably intrude less on the states' prerogative to structure employment relations than the wage-hour provisions of the
FLSA. The difficulty with the National League decision is that it
fails to adequately- analyze the nature or degree of constitutionally

137 The appellant cities and states in National League made only one reference to the
ADEA in their brief. Citing ADEA § 633(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970), they suggested that
this provision explicitly recognizes the desirability of federal-state cooperation in age discrimination cases. Brief for Appellant National League at 75-76, National League, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). Section 633 provides:
(a) Federal action superseding State action.
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State
performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on
account of age except that upon commencement of action under this chapter such
action shall supersede any State action.
(b) Limitation of Federal action upon commencement of State proceedings.
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice,
no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty
days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such
proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
Some courts have interpreted § 633 as a mandatory requirement of deferral to available state
remedies. Gogerv. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp.,
382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974). This result is not based on the view that age discrimination is peculiarly within the competence of the states or that the federal act infringes upon
state sovereignty, but rather upon an analogy between§ 633(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)
(Supp. V 1975) of Title VII. See Note, State Deferral of Complaints, supra note I I 9. Title
VII does not have a literal counterpart to§ 633(a). Although 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970) is
similar, the ADEA provision more explicitly provides for federal preemption of state laws.
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impermissible intrusion and it fails to expressly adopt a balancing
approach for resolving conflicting state and federal interests.
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
A number of courts have suggested that an alternative ground for
sustaining the application of the EPA and the ADEA to the states is
the congressional power to enact appropriate enabling legislation
to guarantee equal protection of the laws pursuant to section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment. 138 Because National League .applied
the tenth amendment limitation only to legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, it is suggested that the EPA and the
ADEA continue to be fully enforceable against the states because
they instead are supported by the grant of power to Congress in
section 5. This argument is based upon an analogy between these
acts and Title VII and upon the fact that congressional reliance on
section 5 to extend Title VII to state employers has been held to
foreclose state claims to sovereign immunity under the eleventh
amendment. 139
The fourteenth amendment restructured federal-state relations
by direct restrictions on state power and by a specific grant of
authority to Congress to enforce its prohibitions by appropriate
legislation .140 This delegation of federal power has been interpreted as vesting in Congress a broad choice of means to effectuate
the purposes and policies of the amendment. Legislation enacted
pursuant to section 5 enjoys a presumption of validity so that
Congress' resolution of competing federal, state, and individual
interests is valid if there is a rational basis for it. 141
138
Usery v. Allegheny County Hosp. Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 1188 (3d Cir. 1976);
·Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 45 U.S.L.W. 2351 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1977); Usery v.
Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377 (N .D. Tex .. Oct. 19, 1976);
Usery v. Washoe County School Dist. 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1373 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 1976);
Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 634 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 1,
1976); Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 717 (D. Utah Sept.
1, 1976).
139
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, but the
legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
% Stat. 103 (1972), which extended the coverage of the Civil Rights Act to state and local
governments, expressly relied upon the congressional power granted in the enabling clauses
of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19,
reprinted in [1972) U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 2137, 2154. Because it does not depend
solely on the commerce power, the extension of Title VII is unaffected by National
League's tenth amendment analysis.
14 ° Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,% S. Ct. 2666 (1976); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39
(1972); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
345-46, 348 (1879). See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), interpreting the
effect of the fifteenth amendment on state sovereignty: "When a State exercises power
wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But
-such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." Id. at 347.
141
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the scope of section 5 was given a
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 142 extended the
coverage of Title VII to state and local governments two years
before the FLSA was amended to reach state employers. Although
the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted pursuant to the commerce
clause and reached the private sector, the 1972 Act was expressly
based upon the congressional power to implement the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments .143
The Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 144 upheld congressional power
under section 5 to authorize a private right of action and monetary
damages for sex discrimination against a state employer under the
1972 Amendments to Title VII. In an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the eleventh amendment does not
preclude a backpay award, because the principle of sovereignty
embodied in that amendment is "necessarily limited" 145 by the
enforcement provisions of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court's rationale was based upon a liberal interpretation of the
power of Congress to intrude on state sovereignty when acting
pursuant to section 5, and it appears to be equally valid in restricting state claims to immunity under the tenth amendment. The
Fitzpatrick Court did not consider whether Title VII is a legitimate
exercise of congressional authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, 146 noting, however, that Congress may, "in
construction similar to the broad interpretation given the necessary and proper clause in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 384 U.S. at 650. Section 5 is a
"positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 651. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 141-43 (1970)
(Douglas,{, dissenting and concurring), 248-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring), 782-84 (Brennan,
J., concurring); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879). See also the liberal construction
of section 2 of the fifteenth amendment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
324-27 (1966).
142
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-15 (1970)). The constitutionality of this extension in coverage was upheld
against a state challenge based on the eleventh amendment immunity to suit in Fitzpatrick v;
Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976). See notes 144-48 and accompanying text infra. See Singer v.
Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retard., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 10,287 (6th Cir.
1975); Gilliam v. Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975); Henry V. Link, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) ,r 10,992 (D.N.D. March 16, 1976); United States v. Milwaukee, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) ,r 10,385 (E.D. Wis. June 25, 1975).
143
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. 19, reprinted in [1972) U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2137, 2154, states:
The expansion of Title VII coverage to State and local government employment is
firmly embodied in the principles of the Constitution of the United States. The
Constitution has recognized that it is inimical to the democratic form of government
to allow the existence of discrimination in those bureaucratic systems which most
directly affect the daily interactions of this Nation's citizens. The clear intention of
the Constitution, embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, is to
prohibit all forms of discrimination.
144
96 s·. Ct. 2666 (1976).
145
Id. at 2671.
146
Id. at 2671 n.11. The district court's finding that the state violated Title VII was not
appealed. The Court was presented only with the eleventh amendment issue as to the
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determining what is. 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for
private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." 147 According to the Fitzpatrick Court, the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment
were specifically intended to restrict state powers with section 5
expressly authorizing congressional action to enforce. its terms.
Distinguishing National League, the Court stated that congressional authority is broader under the fourteenth amendment than
under the commerce clause and is not similarly restricted by state
sovereign immunity . 148
The Court in Fitzpatrick suggested that when Congress seeks to
protect federally-created rights by directly regulating state actions,
as distinct from displacing the states' ability to regulate private
parties, section 5 may furnish a stronger constitutional basis for
congressional power than the commerce clause. 149 Nevertheless,
the scope of congressional power to define and to remedy substantive violations of the fourteenth amendment as well as to preempt
appropriate remedy and not with the question as to whether the application of Title VII to
the states violates the tenth amendment. The Court stated, % S. Ct. at 2670 n.9, that the 1972
Amendments to Title VII were unquestionably an exercise of congressional power under
section 5 with the practical effect of the decision being to grant full relief on the Title VII
cause of action.
147
Id. at 2671.
148
The Court relied upon Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), in support of
its view that the fourteenth amendment altered federal-state relations, expanding the one
and necessarily contracting the other. 96 S. Ct. at 2671. In separate concurring opinions,
Justices Brennan and Stevens both expressed the view that the commerce clause is broad
enough to sustain Title VII rights and remedies without express reliance on section 5. Id. at
2672 (Brennan, J., concurring), at 2672-73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149
The Court in National League declined to consider whether legislation pursuant to
section 5 is subject to the tenth amendment limitation. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The Fitzpatrick
opinion does not offer a satisfactory constitutional explanation for the significant distinction
between the plenary scope of congressional power under section 5 and the more limited
scope of the commerce clause. With respect to the private sector, the commerce clause has
provided a more effective basis for legislation prohibiting discrimination because it avoids
the state action requirement-of the fourteenth amendment. The landmark cases .upholding
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relied upon the commerce clause without reaching the
question whether section 5 presented an alternative ground. See Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
See also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as a valid commerce regulation. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that the public
accommodations provision was invalid under the commerce clause but could be upheld, in
his view, if Congress had relied upon section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 395 U.S. at 309
(Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, concurring separately in Fitzpatrick, argued that Title VII is more
properly justified by tha commerce power, rather than the fourteenth amendment, despite
specific congressional reliance on section 5:
[I] do not believe plaintiffs proved a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
because I am not sure that the 1972 Amendments were "needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment," see Katzenbach v. Morgan, ... I
question whether section 5 of that Amendment is an adequate reply to Connecticut's Eleventh Amendment defense.
96 S. Ct. at 2672.

WINTER

I 977]

Implications of National League

269

existing state laws, absent a judicial determination that certain
conduct violates that amendment, has not been completely
resolved by the Court. 150 While it has been held that congressional
enactments pursuant to section 5 will be subject to only limited
judicial review to determine a rational basis for the legislation, 151
this deference to the legislative judgment presumes that Congress
actually decided that the legislation was, in its view, necessary to
secure the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. The most
serious weakness of the argument that section 5 provides an alternative ground for sustainin_g the EPA and the ADEA is that Con150
See generally Cohen, supra note 44; Cox, The Role of Congress in -Constitutional
Determinations, 40 U. C1N. L. REV. 199 (1971); Fiss, The Fate of An Idea Whose Time Has
Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41
U. Cm. L. REV. 742 (1974); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964).
A majority of the Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), concluded that
Congress had power under section 5 to prohibit all conspiracies to interfere with fourteenth
amendment rights, with or without state action. Id. at 745, 761-62 (Clark, J., concurring), at
782-84 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that section 5 is a
"positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all citizens." Id. at 784. The
Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 382 U.S. 641 (1966), held that Congress could displace an
inconsistent state law by appropriate legislation to enforce the equal protection clause,
absent a prior judicial determination that the precluded state law actually violated the
amendment. Section 5 authorizes Congress to employ any means appropriately adapted to
implement the fourteenth amendment and it will be sustained on review if the judiciary can
perceive a rational basis for it. Id. at 650-53. For a similar analysis of section 2 of the
fifteenth amendment, see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-27 (1966).
But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), where a majority of the Court held that
Congress had no power under the fourteenth amendment to lower the voting age in state
elections because qualifications for voting are expressly reserved to the states. There are
five separate opinions in Oregon, and it is difficult to say to what extent the case narrows
Morgan's construction of congressional power to legislate in the area of equal protection. In
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
enacted pursuant to section 5. The Court stated that Congress intended to fundamentally
alter the relations between the states and the national government with the result that
Congress' role as a guarantor of federally-cri:ated rights against state power was clearly
established. 407 U.S. at 238-42.
In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that the standards applicable
to Title VII cases should not be applied to determine whether allegedly racially discriminatory employment testing violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Statutory
causes of action involve a different burden of proof and a "more probing judicial review of,
and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts" of government officials. 426 U.S. at
247. The case clearly recognizes that Congress can statutorily define more. rigid standards in
prohibiting employment discrimination than would a court applying traditional equal protection review. Congress, acting through Title VII, could create a cause of action and a remedy
for violation of a constitutionally-protected right where none had previously existed. Cf.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U.S.L.W. 4031 (Dec. 7, 1976), holding that a private
employer's disability plan which excluded pregnancy-related benefits did not violate Title
VII. The majority opinion suggests that the legislative standard of Title VII may be construed by reference to judicial interpretations of the equal protection clause, in particular the
decision upholding exclusion of pregnancy benefits in a state-operated disability plan,
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 45 U.S.L.W. at 4033, 4034. The General Electric
decision did not displace a specific congressional determination that this type of disability
plan violates equal protection. Rather, it overruled the administrative interpretation of the
relevant Title VII provision and construed the Act by relying on the judicial interpretation in
Aiello that exclusion of pregnancy benefits does not create a sex-based classification.
151
See notes 140-41 and accompanying text & note 149 supra.
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gress did not expressly rely on section 5 in extending the coverage
of these acts to the states.
Originally intended only to reach the private sector and linked to
the coverage of the FLSA, the acts were extended to the states by
the 1974 FLSA Amendments 152 which relied on the connection
between state governmental activities and interstate commerce.
Although the federal district courts which have sustained the EPA
and the ADEA on section 5 grounds have not been troubled by the
failure of Congress to expressly rely on that source of power, 153
there is no reason to assume that the Court will necessarily infer a
congressional intention to invoke section 5. Moreover, the National League decision reflects an activist judicial attitude toward
the role of the Supreme Court in displacing legislative judgments
on the question of federal-state relations. While the Fitzpatrick
court stated that the federal power involved was the crucial factor
in its decision to override eleventh amendment immunity, there is
no suggestion that the same result would be reached if Congress
had not expressly relied on section 5. Furthermore, in the absence
of an applicable congressional enactment implementing the fourteenth amendment, judicial review of equal protection does not
subject sex and age discrimination to strict scrutiny . 154

152

Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
In Usery v. Allegheny County Hosp. Dist., 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 1188, 1193 (3d Cir.
1976), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. concluding that section 5 provided a "clear
constitutionaljusitification" for the EPA, refused to be limited by congressional reliance on
the commerce power. "In exercising the power of judicial review, as distinguished from the
duty of statutory interpretation, we are concerned with the actual powers of the national
government." Id. at 1193-94. The severable EPA statute, which may be justified under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, is not invalid as applied to the states simply because
it is located in a section of the Code enacted pursuant to the commerce clause. Similarly, in
Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1377. 1378-79 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 19, 1976). the court ruled that the defendant employer has the burden of establishing
that there is no plausible constitutional basis for sustaining a presumptively valid federal
statute. Despite specific congressional reliance on the commerce power, the court found
that the EPA was "easily sustained" under the fourteenth amendment. The court in Usery
v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 717, 719-20 (D. Utah Sept. 1,
1976), argued that Congress had not clearly defined the constitutional foundation for the
ADEA and, on the basis of an analogy to Title VII, it concluded that the legislation was
supportable under either the commerce clause or the fourteenth amendment. In Brown v.
County of Santa Barbara, 45 U.S.L.W. 2351, 2352 (C.D. Cal. Jan.14.1977), the court held
that the express reliance by Congress on the commerce clause did not preclude application
of the fourteenth amendment as a supportable ground for the EPA because the state had not
established that Congress intended to exclude other applicable bases.
154 For cases interpreting the sex classification, see Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), upheld
Title VII' s statutory remedy for sex discrimination in employment against a state employer.
For cases interpreting the age classification, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N .Y. 1971), aff'd mem.,
461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973).
The Weiss Court, refusing to hold that age ceilings upon eligibility for employment are
inherently suspect, discussed the somewhat unique nature of age classifications:
(T]he absence of specific reference to age in the Fourteenth Amendment does not
153
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If the argument that section 5 provides constitutional authority
for the EPA and the ADEA has any validity at all, it must rest on an
analogy between these acts and Title VIl 155 and on the inference
that Congress regarded violations of these statutes as a denial of
equal protection to trigger the exercise of section 5 powers by
Congress. These three acts represent a federal policy against discrimination in employment, and, as implemented in Title VII, this
policy overrides state claims to immunity . 156 The I 972 Amendments to Title VII announced a congressional intention to implement a national policy against discrimination in state and local
governments by providing governmental employees with effective
remedies equivalent to those afforded private employees. 157 Both

alone insulate age classifications from constitutional scrutiny any more than does
the absence of mention of poverty or residency for example .... But being a
classification that cuts fully across racial, religious, and economic lines, and one
that generally bears some relation to mental and physical capacity, age is less likely
to be an invidious distinction.
324 F. Supp. at 77. The per curiam decision in Murgia applied a rational basis standard to
evaluate a challenge that compulsory retirement of state police officers at age 50 violates
equal protection. The classification established by the state statute did not separate a
historically disadvantaged class or a discrete and insular group, nor did it infringe upon a
fundamental right. In finding that the classification rationally furthered legitimate state
purposes, the Court acknowledged that "the drawing of lines that create distinctions is
peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one." 427 U.S. at 314. The Court in Murgia
made no claim under the ADEA, and the Court held only that the state statute does not deny
equal protection of the laws. It is not clear whether the Court would defer to the congressional judgment incorporated in the ADEA that lines drawn between the ages of 40 and 65
impermissibly burden interstate commerce when that judgment collides with a state policy
requiring early retirement for policemen performing essential state functions.
155
See notes 107-12, 117-19 and accompanying text supra.
156
See note 134 supra. One aspect of the relationship between the policies implemented
by Title VII and state sovereignty is the controversy over the discriminatory effect of state
"protective" legislation. Many state laws provide protective regulations which are applicable only to women including laws governing minimum wages and maximum hours. The issue
is whether such state legislation establishes a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ
exception within § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970)), and thus an affirmative defense for the employer, or whether the state laws conflict with the Title VII policy of
requiring employers to hire on the basis of individual abilities. The trend has been toward a
recognition that the federal policy of the Civil Rights Act is paramount to any state right to
make this type of employment decision. State legislation will not be allowed to define and
limit federally-created rights. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 71 I (7th Cir.
1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1%9); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
1971 ); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm 'n Guidelines interpreting Title VII, 29 C .F. R.
§ 1604.2(b)(I) (1975)-state protective legislation discriminates on the basis of sex, conflicts
with Title VII, and is not a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment
practice under Title VII; Wage and Hour Guidelines interpreting the EPA, 29 C.F.R. §
800.163 (1975)-legal restrictions in state or other laws will not operate to make otherwise
equal work unequal or to justify a prohibited wage differential; Durant, The Validity of State
Protective Legislation for Women in Light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 6
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 33 (1971); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, I 186-95 (1971).
157
The House Report states:
The problem of employment discrimination is particularly acute and has the most
deleterious effect in these governmental activities which are most visible to the
minority communities (notably education, la\V enforcement, and the administration
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the EPA 158 and the ADEA 159 are supported by substantial legislative findings of widespread and arbitrary discrimination in
employment. The parallel is most persuasive with respect to the
EPA because a denial of equal pay for equal work is also a cognizable violation of Title VII. Similarly, in many cases, the two acts
provide alternative remedies. 160
If the EPA and the ADEA are sustainable under Congress'
section 5 power, then the constitutionality of the intrusion on state
sovereignty may be resolved• by the rational basis approach used
for section 5 analysis. 161 Utilization of this approach might provide
more consistent validation of federally-protected rights than would
a construction of National League to require a balancing of the
federal and state interests involved.

VI. CONCLUSION

The impact of National League on the continued effectiveness of
the EPA and ADEA, as applied to state and local government
of justice) with the result that the credibility of the government's claim to represent
all the people equally is negated.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in (1972] U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao.
NEWS 2137, 2153. The examples cited by Congress as involving particularly egregious state
discrimination would qualify as essential state functions under the National League test.
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-47 (1974); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840
(1976).
158
S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in (1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687; The Equa"t Pay Act: Hearings
on H.R. 3861 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); The Equal Pay Act: Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See Berger, supra note 104.
159
S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., Isl Sess., reprinted in (1967] U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao.
NEWS 2213; H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong .• 1st Sess. (1967); Age Discrimination in
Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); U.S. DEP'T.
OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER
SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
160 See, e.g., Usery v. Washoe County School Dist., 22 WH Cases (BNA) 1373 (D. Nev.
Oct. 14, 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 161 (N .D. Iowa Aug. 4, 1976). See
Berger, supra note 104.
161
The Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), stated:
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the
various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination
in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on
the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of
alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that
would be affected.· ... It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of
these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.
Id. at 653. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-37 (1966); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-45 (1961).
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employers, is unclear because the scope of the National League
holding is difficult to ascertain. The FLSA, including the EPA, and
the ADEA remain fully enforceable against state operations found
to be nonessential or nontraditional. The EPA and the ADEA may
be enforceable even as to essential government functions on the
ground that the National League Court did not intend to include
freedom to violate these statutes in the states' sovereign right to
structure employment relations. Even if freedom to violate these
statutes is a protected sovereign decision, the state interest served
is outweighed by the federal antidiscrimination interest involved
combined with the less severe degree of intrusion. Further, even if
treated as invalid exercises of the commerce clause under the
National League analysis, the EPA and the ADEA, as applied to
state and local governments, may be sustainable as enabling legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, despite the uncertainty about the implications of the
National League rationale, the decision should not be interpreted
as invalidating the application of the EPA and the ADEA to state
and local governments.
-Ellen B. Spellman

